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Abstract 
 
Some philosophers maintain that consciousness as subjective experience has no bi-
ological function. However, conscious brain events seem very different from un-
conscious ones.  The cortex and thalamus support the reportable qualitative con-
tents of consciousness. Subcortical structures like the cerebellum do not. Likewise, 
attended sensory stimuli are typically reportable as conscious, while memories of 
those stimuli are not so reportable until they are specifically recalled.   
 
Reports of conscious experiences in normal humans always involve subjectivity 
and an implicit observing ego. Unconscious brain events are not reportable, even 
under optimal conditions of report. While there are claimed exceptions to these 
points, they are rare or poorly validated.  
 
Normal consciousness also implies high availability (rapid conscious access) of the 
questions routinely asked of neurological patients in the Mental Status Examina-
tion, such as common sense features of personal identity, time, place, and social 
context. Along with “current concerns,” recent conscious contents, and the like,  
these contents correspond to high frequency items in working memory. While 
working memory contents are not immediately conscious, they can be rapidly re-
called to consciousness.  
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The anatomy and physiology of reportable conscious sensorimotor con-
tents are ultraconserved over perhaps 200 million years of mammalian 
evolution. By comparison, full-fledged language is thought to arise some 
100,000 years ago in homo sapiens, while writing, which enables accel-
erated cultural development, dates between 2.5 and 6 millennia. Contra-
ry to some claims, therefore, conscious waking precedes language by 
hundreds of millions of years.  
 
Like other major adaptations, conscious and unconscious brain events have distinc-
tive biological pros and cons. These involve information processing efficiency, 
metabolic costs and benefits, and behavioral pros and cons. The well-known mo-
mentary limited capacity of conscious contents is an example of an information 
processing cost, while the very large and energy-hungry corticothalamic system 
makes costly metabolic demands.  
 
After a century of scientific neglect, fundamental concepts like “conscious,” “un-
conscious,” “voluntary” and “non-voluntary” are still vitally important, because 
they refer to major biopsychological phenomena that otherwise are difficult to dis-
cuss.  
 
 
 
 
 
1.0 Introduction 
 
The scientific study of consciousness has been debated for more than a century, in 
part because of the difficulty of verifying conscious experiences in humans and 
other species. However, both technical and conceptual advances have now clarified 
the evidence, and viable hypotheses have emerged, so that in 2005 the journal Sci-
ence listed "the biological basis of consciousness" as one of the major open ques-
tions in science. Well-known scientists like Francis Crick and Gerald M. Edelman 
have advanced significant ideas about the brain basis of consciousness, and discus-
sion of non-human consciousness has also found increasing acceptance in neurobi-
ology. (Edelman, 1989; Crick & Koch, 2003; Edelman et al, 2010).  Mammals 
share the corticothalamic system that supports reportable conscious experiences in 
humans. Avian homologies may exist for the corticothalamic complex. (Kaas & 
Preuss, 2003). Some cephalopods have rodent-like brain size, high neuroanatomi-
cal complexity, and flexible problem-solving capacities, suggesting that they may 
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have conscious cognition, assuming that such processes are of ancient origin, or 
that, like lensed eyes, they may exhibit parallel evolution. (Seth et al, 2005).  
 
Humans are our best-studied species when it comes to conscious contents, since we 
can communicate our experiences using speech. However, language is much more 
recent than consciousness as such. Language-related symbolic artifacts appear in 
the archeological record perhaps 100,000 years ago, and the outside estimates are 
perhaps twice that long. The mammalian brain, which prominently features the 
corticothalamic core and its characteristic circadian states, is closer to 200 million 
years of age, and may well emerge even earlier. If we include reptiles, like sala-
manders, which have (iso) cortex and thalamus, conscious events may go back 
even earlier.   
 
In contrast, human aphasics who are deprived of language, or people who never 
developed language, still show the expected behaviorial and neuronal features of 
conscious waking and sleep. Judging by corticothalamic anatomy and physiology, 
sensorimotor aspects of consciousness emerge long before language.  
 
It is useful to divide human conscious experiences into "primary" (sensorimotor) 
and "higher-order" (language-dependent) types. Higher order consciousness is 
thought to flourish mainly in humans. It excludes purely sensory and motor events 
but includes autobiographical memories, esthetic skills and experiences, self-
awareness, prefrontal inhibition of limbic impulses, and adult semantics and syn-
tax. The posterior and motor cortex (and corresponding thalamic nuclei) are in-
volved in primary consciousness, while linguistic and semantic regions of the 
frontal and temporal lobes supports many higher-order functions. While the 
boundary between primary and higher-order consciousness is not precise, the dis-
tinction is often useful.   
 
Both primary and higher-order conscious events are reportable under well-
established conditions. Indeed, all of our knowledge of sensory psychophysics de-
pends upon such reports. In the macaque, “match to sample” tasks have been used 
to report sensory events, especially for vision and memory tasks. Macaques and 
humans have strikingly similar visual psychophysics, and the methodology for 
eliciting that information is also similar.  In non-linguistic species “voluntary 
match to sample reports” provide a useful functional analogue for human verbal 
reports.  
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If such reports are combined with the known anatomy and physiology of conscious 
brains, the circle of proven conscious species may expand beyond humans, pri-
mates, and even mammals.  
 
 
 
1.1 Neuroanatomy and physiology.  
 
The visible anatomy of the brain has been studied in detail since the Renaissance. 
Medical students have learned for generations that bilateral lesions of the human 
cerebellum do not severely impair the flow of reportable conscious experiences, 
although fine motor control is lost. While the scientific understanding of these 
brain structures continues to be refined, these observations still stand.  
 
While circadian states of the corticothalamic (T-C) are regulated by basal brain nu-
clei, Steriade (2006) and others maintain that this very large region can be viewed 
as a single integrated oscillatory medium, ranging from single cells to entire corti-
cal hemispheres. The T-C core is distinguished by a very high level of parallel-
interactive organization, quite different from the highly modular organization of 
the cerebellum. The T-C core is believed to sustain high levels of informational in-
tegration and differentiation, analogous to the worldwide web. (Tononi, 2004).  
 
The T-C core appears to be the primary organ of learned adaptation in humans and 
other mammals. In general, the waking (conscious) state is well-adapted to goal-
relevant tasks like sensory perception, learning, exploration, path-finding, infant-
mother interactions, and species-specific problem-solving (such as food finding), 
while SWS is adapted for the consolidation of learned memory traces acquired dur-
ing waking. "Active sleep," associated with dream reports in humans, shows wak-
ing-like EEG along with skeletal muscle inhibition characteristic of SWS. Brain 
imaging of human dream activity shows high BOLD levels in limbic (emotional 
and appetitive) and visual regions (Dang-Vu et al, 2010).  
 
Cortex and thalamus take up about 80% of the volume of the human cranium, con-
sisting mostly of white matter fibers emerging from multi-layered arrays of neu-
ronal cell bodies.  The nuclei of the thalamus are folded neuronal arrays that close-
ly mirror cortical regions. Major input, output, and internal pathways together cre-
ate the largest parallel-interactive biological structure known. The corticothalamic 
(T-C) complex may use about 20% of the total energy intake, which cannot be in-
terrupted without causing cell death (Baars and Gage, 2010).  
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Circadian states alter the dominant electrophysiological regime of cortex and thal-
amus, between waking, slow-wave sleep and REM dreams. Waking is optimized 
for learning and voluntary control. Slow-wave sleep enables consolidation of in-
formation acquired during the preceding waking period. Hundreds of genes are ex-
pressed differently in different circadian states.  
 
In the waking brain, therefore, conscious contents, as assessed by human voluntary 
reports and their analogues in animals, are distinctly associated with cortex and 
thalamus, while unconscious information processing occurs sub-cortically, in the 
cerebellum, basal ganglia, brainstem, etc.  In humans, at least, subcortical struc-
tures do not directly underlie conscious contents, though neural activity triggered 
in the body and sensorium is reflected in consciousness via thalamic and cortical 
projections. Many central nervous system functions are never conscious, even dur-
ing the waking state. For instance, hypothalamic and vestibular receptors do not 
result in distinctive conscious contents, while the classical receptor pathways often 
do.  
 
The corticothalamic complex therefore appears to enable conscious experiences "as 
such." However, not all cortical contents are reportable. The so-called “dorsal 
stream of vision” (occipito-parietal) is known to have egocentric and allocentric 
visuotopical maps, but unlike ventral visual events, these cannot be reported volun-
tarily. Dorsal stream maps can have dramatic effects on conscious vision, as in the 
case of parietal hemineglect. However, they do so indirectly, presumably when the 
two visual streams are combined in the medial temporal lobe. Such interactions be-
tween conscious and unconscious sensory streams are believed to occur in other 
sensory systems as well.  
 
There are probably no entirely conscious tasks; all studied tasks involve both con-
scious and unconscious elements.  
 
 
 
1.2 Electrophysiology.  
 
 
EEG “arousal" has been the basic electrophysiological index of waking conscious-
ness in humans and related species. It is the appearance of fast, irregular, and low-
voltage EEG across the mammalian cortex, as well as in deeper brain structures. In 
healthy animals EEG arousal is always accompanied by signs of behavioral arous-
al, including alert posture, receptor orienting, vigilant scanning of the surround-
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ings, social signaling, physiological signs of the orienting response (including 
widespread autonomic responding), voluntary and emotional activities, and well-
timed, context-sensitive behavior. (Baars and Gage, 2010)  
 
Scalp EEG sacrifices all but 0.1 percent of the electrical field amplitude of the cor-
tex, so that implanted subdural electrodes are far superior as a recording tool, sup-
plemented by a variety of sophisticated in vivo instruments, ranging from MRI and 
fMRI to voltage-sensitive dyes. In vivo experimental interventions also include 
chemical, electrical, and electromagnetic field stimulation. 
 
Since waking-like cortical EEG also occurs during REM dreams, EEG arousal is 
not a sufficient sign of normal waking by itself. It is useful to add at least one more 
easily observable index, such as voluntary responding to stimulation.   
 
In general, healthy humans and other mammals are arousable by intense stimula-
tion at all times. During unconscious sleep behavioral arousal still occurs in re-
sponse to intense stimulation, like loud sounds, calling someone’s first name, or 
pressure on the thumb, a common test for coma. Failure of stimulus-evoked behav-
ioral arousal is a sign of pathology, except in the case of general anesthesia.  
 
Slow wave sleep (SWS) is the only natural unconscious state, characterized by 
regular, high amplitude delta waves in the corticothalamic system (2-4 Hz). How-
ever, slow background oscillations occur at all times, at < 1 Hz. These slow oscilla-
tions are not easily visible in the scalp EEG.  
 
Dreaming states are often but not always signaled by rapid, stereotyped eye 
movements (REM). Classical REM dreams show waking-like EEG. During SWS 
massive numbers of cortical and thalamic neurons pause during the trough of the 
delta wave,  thereby apparently blocking the free flow of neuronal firing and inter-
action. However, when people are awoken from SWS they may report verbal sleep 
mentation, which is said to be less imaginative and less visual than normative 
dreams. The reason for SWS mentation is unknown, but it may be that some corti-
cal islands of waking activity can remain during behavioral sleep, especially during 
the peak of the repeating delta wave. Islands of normal cortical functioning are also 
known to occur during some epileptic seizures.  
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2.0 Conscious waking and sleep as biological adaptations. 
 
The conscious state makes possible all goal-directed activities in humans. 
Consciousness also enables strikingly precise reports of sensory input and execu-
tive attention, which brings specific events to consciousness in much the way that 
voluntary eye movements enable specific visual inputs (Posner et al). Selective at-
tention and conscious cognition enable both working memory (notably inner re-
hearsal) and encoding of events in episodic memory.  Thus the  conscious state and 
its stream of reportable contents, including action planning and attentional control, 
appear to support the great bulk of biologically significant, goal-directed behavior 
in humans.  During sleep and dreams we can do none of these things. 
 
  
 
 
2.1 Metabolic and information processing costs and benefits.  
 
The pros and cons of sleep and waking can be divided into metabolic and infor-
mation processing.  
 
The chief information processing cost of conscious and attentional function is 
“limited momentary capacity,”  and therefore distractibility. Predators routinely 
make surprise attacks from hidden cover when a prey animal appears to be dis-
tracted by food or by spoor-following. Distraction is itself a function of limited fo-
cal processing capacity. Voluntary attention is also a limited capacity function, so 
that voluntary selection of one or another potential conscious event takes a signifi-
cant period of time and loads limited capacity.  
 
When humans and animals are surprised by some unexpected, significant event, it 
can take them many seconds to recover their previous stable orientation. In the 
cases of psychological trauma adaptation can take much longer. A surprising event 
can block conscious sensory processing by half a second or longer. While such 
time and processing costs are not significant in safe situations, they can make a dif-
ference between life and death in cases of predation, sexual competition, infant 
protection or physical accidents. These factors impact reproductive fitness, and in 
principle one could imagine a non-conscious animal that might not face these 
tradeoffs.  
 
For example, a number of human babies are born with agenesis of the corpus callo-
sum, so that direct communication between the hemispheres is either blocked, or it 
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is developmentally accomplished subcortically. If humans would achieve a net 
benefit from having two separate streams of consciousness, one for each half of the 
sensorimotor hemifield, one might expect that humans without a corpus callosum 
obtain a net benefit in reproductive fitness. While that biological experiment ap-
pears to occur spontaneously tens of thousands of times every year, humans with 
binary streams of consciousness have not driven out more conventional brains. 
This suggests a net benefit for the otherwise remarkable limitations of having a 
single and narrow conscious stream in a brain that would seem to be otherwise ca-
pable of intelligent parallel processing.  
 
Consciousness is strongly associated with sensory processes, exploratory learning 
and the construction of cognitive maps of the body and the environment, both 
through hippocampal and parietal regions. Prefrontal functions are involved in 
problem solving, decision making, and infant-mother attachment, as well as limbic  
impulse control. All these capacities are of reproductive and survival benefit.  
 
 Thus conscious processes pose both information-processing costs and benefits for 
mammals.  
 
 
2.2 Metabolic costs. 
 
The metabolic cost of the conscious state, and of specific conscious experiences, 
appears to be substantial. These costs are associated with the energetics of the T-C 
system, which occupies an estimated 80 percent of the cranium in humans.  
 
 
 
2.3 Learning in primary consciousness and sleep.  
 
While some major costs of the brain system that enables consciousness are clear 
enough, the positive function of consciousness has long been controversial. On the 
simplest observational level, however, all goal-directed survival and reproductive 
actions occur during the waking state, and disappear during sleep, when the inhibi-
tion of skeletal musculature prohibits goal-directed, cortically guided actions. 
Needless to say, vegetative functions and a great variety of other non-goal-directed 
neuronal functions continue during sleep. The sleep/waking cycle has been reliably 
associated with the differential expression of some hundreds of nervous system 
genes. These are thought to be particularly associated with learning and neuronal 
plasticity. Slow Wave Sleep is believed to accelerate memory consolidation via 
N
at
ur
e 
Pr
ec
ed
in
gs
 : 
do
i:1
0.
10
38
/n
pr
e.
20
12
.6
77
5.
1 
: P
os
te
d 
11
 J
an
 2
01
2
B.J. Baars The biological cost of consciousness.    
Nature Precedings, 2012   page 9 1/11/12 
structural  protein production, the replenishment of mitochondria, rebuilding neu-
ronal and glial stores of neurotransmitters, and the like.  
 
In rats it has been shown that three weeks of total sleep deprivation results in death 
due to unknown causes. The inverse, namely the induction of long-term coma-like 
states via general anesthetics, for example, does not have direct lethal effects, and 
in the case of humans, long-term coma has been known to last as long as eleven 
years while still allowing for recovery of consciousness. However, in these cases it 
is not certain whether momentary periods of non-behavioral waking may have oc-
curred on a regular basis, a phenomenon that is now thought to be common enough 
to suggest a specific diagnosis for coma-like intermittent waking, the so-called 
Minimally Conscious State (MCS).  
 
Because sleep and waking are mutually enhancing states, and seem to reflect the 
same underlying brain structures, the fact that sleep deprivation leads to rapid 
death while waking deprivation does not should not be interpreted to mean that 
sleep is a biological necessity but waking is not. Counter to that runs the observa-
tion that no goal-driven survival and reproductive actions occur in mammals out-
side of the waking state.  
 
 
 
2.4 Reproductive fitness.  
 
Vocalization, as in speech and song, and the associated arts of drumming and 
rhythmic social dancing, have been thought to arise as a mechanism of sexual se-
lection. They are certainly used that way by human cultures. In some primates, like 
gibbons, vocalization is used for sexual as well as dominance signaling. However, 
vocal display also attracts attention from unwelcome enemies and sexual competi-
tors. The ability to "narrow-cast" rather than broadcast sounds is therefore plausi-
bly a safer way to attract attention from potential mates.  
 
The brain regions for language, like Broca's and Wernicke's areas, are thought to 
be crucial for "higher-order consciousness" (Edelman, 1989), which make very fast 
cultural development possible for humans. However, these cortical regions have 
long evolutionary histories long before the primates. Lateralization of sound pro-
duction is found in guinea pigs as well as birds. The putatively “language-related” 
gene FOX P2 is now known to exist in reptiles as well as mammals.  
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In humans, speech and other frontal lobe capacities may have co-evolved. They are 
plausibly the crucial enabling capacities for cultural development. Thus speech, 
song, dance, and other symbolic forms of expression, and their biological corre-
lates such as executive overriding of limbic brain regions, the use of symbolic sig-
naling for group identity, and the like, all define a very large domain of empirical 
study, and can only be mentioned here in passing.  
 
 
 
 
3.0 Pathologies of sleep and waking.  
 
In general, we do not have a foolproof objective index of conscious (i.e., subjec-
tively normal) and unconscious states. While scalp EEG, skeletal muscle tone, vol-
untary eye movements, and voluntary responding to questions and stimuli are ex-
tremely useful, they are by no means perfect indices of brain states. 
 
A great deal of medical and basic research is focused on sleep disorders. It should 
be pointed out that there are numerous waking disorders as well. Because the word 
“consciousness” has been viewed with some suspicion, we may be missing crucial 
aspects of mental disorders or the dementias because we do not consider them to 
be disorders of waking consciousness. All of the DSM Axis I disorders, for exam-
ple, are also deficits of voluntary control over covert or overt brain activities.  
 
Anything that impairs normal waking consciousness increases risk to survival and 
reproduction. While waking consciousness has its own informational and metabol-
ic costs, biological risk due to the loss of consciousness is vastly greater. During 
natural sleep and dreaming all goal-directed activities are blocked. Before going to 
sleep animals seek safe shelter underground, in denses bushes or rock formations, 
hollows and trees, or among other group members. Sleeping animals are attuned to 
danger signals that trigger arousal, which may vary from species to species, and 
both seasonally and situationally. Thus the presence of predators during the day 
may also trigger more awakenings to potential dangers during sleep.  
 
 
 
 
3.1 Coma, anesthesia, and the epilepsies.  
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In the last decade, the diagnosis of irreversible coma, as assessed by EEG and be-
havioral unresponsiveness, has come under serious question.  Up to 40% of coma 
or Persistent Vegetative State (PVS) patients may be in an intermittently conscious 
state. For that reason the diagnosis of "Minimally Conscious State" (MCS) is being 
advanced as a more precise and ethical alternative to PVS. Some medications have 
also been reported to improve or even reverse diagnosed coma.  
 
On the other end of the continuum, apparent general anesthesia may hide mid-
operative awakenings that can be recalled afterwards by patients, even if the at-
tending anesthesiologist may not detect them.   
 
The appearance of coma may hide underlying periods of consciousness, most spec-
tacularly in the case of "locked in syndrome," where the patient is normally con-
scious while skeletal muscle control is widely inhibited. Voluntary eye movements 
have been used to enable paralyzed patients to communicate by foveal fixation on 
the letters of a keyboard.  Some locked-in patients have carried on web-based con-
versations over long periods of time. 
 
The epilepsies show mixtures of conscious and unconscious events, voluntary con-
trol and non-voluntary automatisms, as well as variations in the spread of brain ar-
eas that are recruited by seizure activity. Epilepsy is also associated with mystical 
and other non-ordinary conscious experiences.  
 
Epileptic unconsciousness mimics SWS in many respects, including slow, high-
amplitude, widespread, hypersynchronous scalp EEG. These are important fron-
tiers for current research.  
 
 
 
 
4.0 Higher-order consciousness.  
 
 Culture, self-awareness, language, music, technology, science, and the arts all de-
pend upon language and related aspects of higher-order consciousness. The frontal 
lobes --- classically called “the organ of civilization “ --- are still some of the least 
well-understood areas of the cortex, because of their complexity and variability 
under different task conditons.  
 
 
4.1 Speech.  
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The speech regions of cortex almost certainly co-evolved with specialization of the 
vocal tract, which makes human speech probably the fastest and most precisely 
controlled flow of sequential movements in the animal repertoire. This co-
evolution plausibly occurred over long evolutionary epochs.  
 
Broca's area is almost always lateralized, with some 90 percent of humans using 
the left hemisphere for the production of speech.  Auditory speech perception ap-
pears to be bilateral, though the dominant hemisphere is believed to be have better 
temporal auditory discrimination while the non-dominant side may excel in the 
emotional and metaphorical interpretation of speech.  
 
The loudness, segmental length and auditory resonances of vocalization are also 
good surrogates for lung capacity, strength, reproductive capacity, mental alert-
ness, youth and muscular vigor, and the availability of food, as well as clan size, 
gender and social dominance.  
 
The most important point for the present purpose, however, is that speech as an 
evolutionary development appears to greatly accelerate cultural evolution, includ-
ing "higher order consciousness," which Edelman (1989) suggests includes shared 
meanings and abstractions, the entire vocabulary of human languages as a set of 
cultural discoveries, and indeed science, the arts, and technology. Indeed, even to-
day the size of one’s vocabulary is a good predictor of intelligence, which may re-
flect the capacity for mental effort as shown by BOLD activation of the prefrontal 
cortex.  
 
About 6 millenia ago vocal speech was transformed into widespread writing sys-
tems, as in the case of China, Egypt, Sumer, India and the Middle East. About 2.5 
millenia ago, phonemic and syllabic writing systems greatly simplified the encod-
ing of vocal speech into written symbols. Widespread writing enabled multi-
generational cultural memory among extended populations, leading to city states 
and all their attendant sociological and cultural complexities. Thus over the last 3-6 
millenia cultural evolution has increased much faster than biological evolution, 
leading both to benefits and difficulties.   
 
Thus vocal speech and its related evolutionary functions, like song, dance, execu-
tive control and social coordination, produce many novel conscious contents, in-
cluding concepts, beliefs, symbolic expressions, individual and shared fantasies, 
musical forms, dancing, and the like, which become socially shared as the speaking 
brain evolves.  
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4.2 Self-awareness, flow and absorption.  
 
Lucid dreaming occurs when subjects are aware they are dreaming. During REM 
dreaming (with waking-like EEG), trained lucid-dreaming subjects can hear audi-
tory stimuli, and can count up to ten in inner speech, signaling the beginning and 
end of the ten-second period using agreed-upon voluntary eye movements. This 
self-aware type of dreaming has been widely reported informally, and the ten-
second period corresponds well to the typical decay time of short-term memory 
during waking. The commonly reported experience of dream paralysis may in fact 
be spontaneous lucid dreaming, in which subjects realize that their limb and head 
muscles are inhibited, which is part of the normal physiology of sleep and dreams. 
When people try (cortically) to move their muscles, and they cannot move, they 
may feel unpleasantly paralyzed. However, dream paralysis is not a disorder but 
plausibly a self-aware period of normal dreaming.  
 
Self-awareness in general may depend upon the frontal lobes. Thus lucid dreaming 
is in a sense the opposite of drowsy or sedated states, when people have waking 
sensory abilities but little executive control or self-awareness. Experiences of "con-
scious flow" as reported by high-functioning athletes or artists may also involve 
"frontal hypometabolic" states. High levels of theta and alpha power have been 
found in such states. High-functioning individuals commonly report a drop in un-
needed self-consciousness during flow states, such as distracting worries about 
one's own performance.  
 
 
 
 
5.0 Summary and conclusions.  
 
Conscious waking and its variety of reportable contents appears to be biologically 
ancient and widespread. All reportable sensory and executive motor events involve 
cortical and often consciously-mediated processes. Like other biological adapta-
tions, conscious waking, sleep, and dreaming appar to have distinctive costs and 
benefits.  
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Conscious waking allows for all explicit, goal-directed actions to occur. Waking 
may be optimized for learnng, and most of what we know about the sensory system 
comes from human and animal “behavioral reports” during the conscious waking 
state. Slow-wave sleep may be optimized for memory consolidation, while the role 
of classical REM dreams remains unresolved.  
 
Metabolically, waking, sleep and dreaming depend upon the thalamus and cortex, 
which together occupy some 80 percent of cranial capacity, a very large biological 
investment. From an information processing perspective both conscious waking 
and sleep have survival and reproductive costs, consciousness because of the well-
known limited momentary capacity of conscious contents, which place animals at 
risk of accidents or predation during moments of distraction. Sleep renders animals 
unresponsive to biological dangers and opportunities, and apparently unable to 
learn.  
 
While philosophical debates continue, the scientific key is to compare conscious 
and unconscious brain states and reportable vs. unreportable contents. These are 
relatively easily observable, and allow us to gain a third-person perspective on 
what has traditionally been described from a subjective point of view. Over the 
past decades a very large empirical and medical literature has emerged using such 
comparisons.  
 
 The medical sciences have never adopted behavioristic strictures against con-
sciousness, because its everyday relevance in the hospital and clinic is indisputa-
ble. In science, concepts like subjective consciousness and volition are also indis-
pensable.  
 
 
Primary or sensorimotor consciousness provides the biological foundation of 
mammalian environmental learning. Cultural evolution is crucially dependent upon 
frontal lobe functions like language and executive control. The explosion of cultur-
al technologies in the last 6-100 millennia is therefore dependent upon both prima-
ry and higher-level consciousness.  
 
  
N
at
ur
e 
Pr
ec
ed
in
gs
 : 
do
i:1
0.
10
38
/n
pr
e.
20
12
.6
77
5.
1 
: P
os
te
d 
11
 J
an
 2
01
2
B.J. Baars The biological cost of consciousness.    
Nature Precedings, 2012  page 15 1/11/12 
 
References 
 
 
 
Baars, B. J. (1988). A cognitive theory of consciousness. New York: Cambridge 
University Press.  
 
Baars, B. J. (2002). The conscious access hypothesis: Origins and recent evidence. 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 6(1), 47 52.  
 Baars, B. J., & Franklin, S. (2003a). How conscious experience and working 
memory interact. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7(4), 166 172.  
Baars, B. J., Ramsoy, T. Z., & Laureys, S. (2003b). Brain, conscious experience 
and the observing self. Trends in Neurosciences, 26(12), 671 675. 
Bernard J. Baars & Nicole M. Gage (Eds) (2010) Cognition, Brain & Conscious-
ness: An Introduction to Cognitive Neuroscience. (2nd Edition). 
 
Baddeley, A. (2000). The episodic buffer: a new component of working memory? 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 4(11), 417 423.  
 
Baumeister, R. F. (2008). Ego depletion: is the active self a limited resource?" 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (7405), 1252 1265. 
Bickerton, D. (1990). Language and species. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Crick F, Koch C. (2003) A framework for consciousness. Nat Neurosci. 2003 
Feb;6(2):119-26. 
 
Damasio, A. R. (1989). Time-locked multiregional retroactivation: A systems level 
proposal for the neural substrates of recall and recognition. Cognition, 33, 25 32.  
Damasio, A. R., Grabowski, T. J., Bechara, A., et al. (2000). Subcortical and corti-
cal brain activity during the feeling of self- generated emotions. Nature Neurosci-
ence, 3(10), 1049 1056.  
Darwin, C. (1872). The expression of the emotions in man and animals. London: 
N
at
ur
e 
Pr
ec
ed
in
gs
 : 
do
i:1
0.
10
38
/n
pr
e.
20
12
.6
77
5.
1 
: P
os
te
d 
11
 J
an
 2
01
2
B.J. Baars The biological cost of consciousness.    
Nature Precedings, 2012  page 16 1/11/12 
John Murray. 
 
Dehaene, S., & Naccache, L. (2001). Towards a cognitive permanence of con-
sciousness: Basic evidence and a workspace framework. Cognition, 79, 1 37. 
Dang-Vu TT, Schabus M, Desseilles M, Sterpenich V, Bonjean M, Maquet P. 
(2010) Functional neuroimaging insights into the physiology of human sleep. 
Sleep. Dec 1;33(12):1589-603. 
Edelman, G. M. (1989). The remembered present: A biological theory of con-
sciousness. New York: Basic Books Inc.  
Edelman, G. M., & Tononi, G. (2000). A universe of consciousness: How matter 
becomes imagination. New York: Basic Books Inc. 
Kaas, J. H., & Preuss, T. M. (2003). Human brain evolution. In L. R. Squire, J. L. 
Roberts, N. C. Spitzer, M. J. Zigmond, S. K. 
 
 Kanwisher, N., McDermott, J., & Chun, M. M. (1997). The fusiform face area: A 
module in human extrastriate cortex specialized for face perception. The Journal of 
Neuroscience, 17(11), 4302 4311. 
Seth, A. K., Izhikevich, E., Reeke, G. N., & Edelman, G. M. (2006). Theories and 
measures of consciousness: An extended framework. Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences, 103(27), 10799 10804. 
Singer, J. L. (1993). Experimental studies of ongoing conscious experience discus-
sion 116 122. Ciba Foundation Symposium, 174, 100 116. 
Stephan, K. M., Thaut, M. H., Wunderlich, G., et al. (2002). Conscious and sub-
conscious sensorimotor synchronization prefrontal cortex and the influence of 
awareness. Neuroimage, 15(2), 345 352.  
Steriade, M. (2006). Grouping of brain rhythms in corticothalamic systems. Neuro-
science, 137(4), 1087 1106. 
Tononi, G. (2004). An information integration theory of consciousness. BMC Neu-
roscience, 5, 42. 
 
Tononi, G., Srinivasan, R., Russell, D. P., & Edelman, G. M. (1998). Investigating 
neural correlates of conscious perception by frequency-tagged neuromagnetic re-
sponses. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of 
N
at
ur
e 
Pr
ec
ed
in
gs
 : 
do
i:1
0.
10
38
/n
pr
e.
20
12
.6
77
5.
1 
: P
os
te
d 
11
 J
an
 2
01
2
B.J. Baars The biological cost of consciousness.    
Nature Precedings, 2012  page 17 1/11/12 
America, 95(6), 3198 3203.  
Trzepacz, PT; Baker RW (1993). The Psychiatric Mental Status Examination. Ox-
ford, U.K.: Oxford University Press. p. 202. ISBN 0195062515. 
 
 
N
at
ur
e 
Pr
ec
ed
in
gs
 : 
do
i:1
0.
10
38
/n
pr
e.
20
12
.6
77
5.
1 
: P
os
te
d 
11
 J
an
 2
01
2
